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I. INTRODUCTION
The City of North Miami ("City") has a new policy, Regulation 1-46.'
This regulation informs anyone who smoked within the past year not to
waste her time applying for a job with the City because regardless of her
existing abilities, she will not be considered a qualified applicant.2 This
policy contains inconsistencies because it does not prohibit the applicant,
once hired, from smoking on the job. It also does not prohibit current
employees from smoking. In City of North Miami v. Kurtz,3 the Supreme
Court of Florida addressed the issue of whether the City may have a
regulation that prohibits smoking prior to, and as a prerequisite for
employment.' This comment focuses on the court's decision in that case
and resulting ramifications in the State of Florida.
The City claims this regulation was established to reduce costs to
taxpayers and to increase the productivity of its workers.' The goal of this
regulation was to "gradually reduce the number of smokers in the City's
work force by means of natural attrition."6 The City attempted to demon-
strate how costs to taxpayers will be reduced. It submitted evidence
indicating that employees who smoke cost the City more than those who do
not.' Accordingly, the City claims these interests justify the intrusion into
Kurtz's privacy!
In contrast, Arlene Kurtz claims the City is invading her right to privacy
by enforcing this regulation; therefore, this regulation is unconstitutional
under the federal and state constitutions.' She believes that since she has
a legitimate expectation of privacy in her own home and her private life, the
City's interests are insufficient to outweigh those expectations. 10 She
claims that whether she smokes off-duty is irrelevant to the kind of job
1. Regulation 1-46 provides: "All applicants must be a-non-user [sic] of tobacco or
tobacco products for at least one year immediately preceding application, as evidence [sic]
by the sworn affidavit of the application [sic]." Answer Brief of Respondent at 4, City of
N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1995) (No. 92-2038).
2. Id.
3. 653 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 1995 WL 588370 (U.S. 1996).
4. Id. at 1026.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1027.
8. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1027.
9. Kurtz v. City of N. Miami, 625 So. 2d 899, 901 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (hold-
ing that Regulation 1-46 violated Kurtz's right of privacy), rev'd, 653 So. 2d 1025 (Fla.
1995), cert. denied, 1995 WL 588370 (1996).
10. Id
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sought." She further claims that this regulation is intrusive because it
permits City employers to enter her private life to determine if she is a
suitable employee based upon their own subjective standards.'
In an examination of the court's opinion, this comment first discusses
the specific facts of this case and the trial history which eventually brought
the case to the Supreme Court of Florida. Second, it discusses an individ-
ual's right to privacy, which grants freedom from governmental intrusions
arising from both the federal and state constitutions. Third, the comment
reviews the stringent test that must be proven by the state to allow an
intrusion into a person's privacy. This section examines how the elements
of the test were applied by the court. Fourth, this comment takes a brief
look at how two other states deal with the privacy issue and why Florida
ought to follow their lead in practice.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
A. The Facts of City of North Miami v. Kurtz
In 1989, the City was accepting applications for a clerk-typist posi-
tion. 3 Arlene Kurtz desired a clerical job with the City, so she submitted
an application. 4 In December, 1989, she passed the examination for all
prospective applicants 5 and was deemed a qualified applicant.' 6 Three
months later, the City passed Regulation 1-46,"7 which requires each
applicant to sign an affidavit verifying that she has not smoked for at least
one year prior to being hired by the City.'
Two months after this regulation was passed, the City notified Kurtz of
an opening for a clerk-typist. 9 However, she was told at her interview that
the City no longer considered hiring applicants who had used tobacco or
tobacco products within the past year.2' Kurtz informed the interviewer
11. Answer Brief of Respondent at 20.
12. Ia at22.
13. Kurtz, 625 So. 2d at 900.
14. Md.
15. Iai
16. Answer Brief of Respondent at 5. The fact that Kurtz was qualified for the position
of clerk-typist was not disputed by the City. IU
17. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
18. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
19. Kurtz, 625 So. 2d at 900.
20. The reason that the City would not hire applicants who have used tobacco or
tobacco products within the past year was that the regulation passed just two months earlier
1996] 1395
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that "she was a smoker and could not truthfully sign an affidavit to comply
with the regulation."21 The interviewer proceeded to tell Kurtz that she,
as well as all other applicants, would not be considered for a city job unless
she remained "smoke free" for one year.22
B. Procedural Posture
Kurtz sought a judgment declaring the regulation unconstitutional and
injunctive relief enjoining the City's enforcement of the regulation.23 After
cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court found for the City and
held that the regulation did not violate the United States or the Florida
Constitution.24
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment
and determined that an individual's privacy rights are invaded when the City
requires a person to refrain from smoking for one year as a prerequisite to
being considered for employment. 2' The court found that the City's
claimed interests were insufficient to outweigh Kurtz's right to privacy.26
The court stated, "Regulation 1-46 violates article I, section 23, of the
Florida Constitution as the regulation constitutes an impermissible intrusion
into Kurtz' private conduct and has no relevance to the performance of the
duties involved with a clerk-typist."'27
After the district court issued its decision, it certified the following
question to the Supreme Court of Florida as one of great public importance:
DOES ARTICLE I, SECTION 23 OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITU-
TION PROHIBIT A MUNICIPALITY FROM REQUIRING JOB
APPLICANTS TO REFRAIN FROM USING TOBACCO OR
TOBACCO PRODUCTS FOR ONE YEAR BEFORE APPLYING
FOR, AND AS A CONDITION FOR BEING CONSIDERED FOR
EMPLOYMENT, EVEN WHERE THE USE OF TOBACCO IS NOT
RELATED TO JOB FUNCTION IN THE POSITION SOUGHT BY
THE APPLICANT? 28
prohibited such hiring.
21. Kurtz, 625 So. 2d at 900.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 902-03.
26. Kurtz, 625 So. 2d at 901.
27. Id.
28. City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1026 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied., 1995
WL 588370 (U.S. 1996).
[Vol. 201396
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The court answered the preceding question in the negative and found that
Kurtz was not afforded protection by the United States Constitution nor by
Florida's explicit constitutional privacy provision.29
IH. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY
A. Right of Privacy Implicit in the United States Constitution
There is no explicit right to privacy in the United States Constitution.3
Rather, "the First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected
from governmental intrusion."3 Since the right to privacy is not explicit,
the Supreme Court struggled with the idea of how far privacy should be
extended, as illustrated through a line of cases dealing with the issue.
The first case to recognize this fundamental right to privacy was
Griswold v. Connecticut.32 In Griswold, the Supreme Court established a
right of privacy for married couples to be free from governmental intrusion
in deciding whether to use contraceptives.33 The Court cleverly framed the
issue as follows: "[W]ould we allow the police to search the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contracep-
tives?"34 The obvious answer of "no" allowed the Court to establish a
right of privacy in the marriage relationship and demonstrate the absurdity
of an absence of such a right.35
The Court expanded the right of privacy in Eisenstadt v. Baird.36 It
stated that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."37 This case is significant because it
29. IL
30. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
31. Id. In Griswold, the Court held a Connecticut statute that forbade the use of
contraceptives violates the right of marital privacy. Id. at 485-86. Griswold was the first
case to recognize a fundamental right of privacy; however, this particular case limited that
right to marital relationships. Id. at 486.
32. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
33. Id. at 486.
34. Id. at 485.
35. Id. at 486.
36. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (overturning conviction for distributing contraceptives to
unmarried persons and allowing individual right to privacy).
37. Id. at 453 (alteration in original).
1996] 1397
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extended the right of privacy to individuals and no longer limited it to
married couples.
Shortly after the Eisenstadt decision, the Court further broadened the
right of privacy in Roe v. Wade.35 In Roe, the Court first reaffirmed the
implicit right of privacy in the United States Constitution.39 The Court
then found that the right of privacy includes a woman's right, although not
absolute, to determine whether or not she will terminate her pregnancy."
Finally and most importantly, in 1969, the Court decided Stanley v.
Georgia.4 In Stanley, a man was arrested for possessing obscene materials
in his own home.42 The Court found that a statute which punished mere
private possession of obscene material was unconstitutional.43 Although
Stanley deals with obscenity, the case stands for the proposition that a man's
home is his castle. To illustrate, the court stated that "a State has no
business telling a man, sitting alone in his house, what books he may read
or what films he may watch."44  A person's right to privacy-to be let
alone from governmental intrusion-is "the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized man. 45 While not explicit in the
United States Constitution, other cases decided by the Court following
Stanley also recognized the basic right to be free from governmental
intrusion in the privacy of one's own home.46
While the right to be free from governmental intrusion in one's home
is merely implicit in the United States Constitution, several states have
attempted to provide that right greater strength by adding explicit privacy
provisions in their own state constitutions. 47 Florida is one of the states
providing such a right.
38. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (including woman's qualified right to terminate her
pregnancy in realm of right to privacy).
39. Il at 152.
40. I1 at 153.
41. 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969) (holding statute criminalizing possession of obscene
material in privacy of one's home is unconstitutional).
42. Id. at 558. The Georgia statute under which he was charged was "knowingly
hav[ing] possession of ... obscene matter." Id.
43. Id. at 559.
44. Id, at 565.
45. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
46. See United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973) (recognizing that zone of
privacy protected by Stanley does not extend beyond the home).
47. See, e.g., John Sanchez, Constitutional Privacy in Florida: Between the Idea and
the Reality Falls the Shadow, 18 NOVA L. REV. 775, 799 (1994).
1398 [Vol. 20
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B. Florida's Explicit "Right to Privacy" Provision
Florida has an explicit privacy provision in its constitution.48
Florida's privacy provision, Article I, section 23," however, has not been
given the power that was intended when it was adopted in 1980.0 It has
been observed that "all too often privacy plays second banana to competing
interests,""1 even though the purpose of this provision was to provide more
protection. The drafters' intent is illustrated by their rejection of "the use
of the words 'unreasonable' or 'unwarranted' before the phrase 'governmen-
tal intrusion' in order to make the privacy right as strong as possible."' 2
By deleting those words, the drafters avoided the application of the weaker
levels of judicial scrutiny and provided for a strict scrutiny analysis when
determining violations of an individual's privacy rights." When drafting
the amendment, the Florida legislators' intended to maintain the ideal that
"an individual has a fundamental right to be left alone so that he is free to
lead his private life according to his own beliefs free from unreasonable
48. FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 23. Florida's explicit privacy provision, article I, section 23,
provides the following: "Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section
shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as
provided by law." Id. For a listing of other states that also have explicit privacy provisions,
see Sanchez, supra note 47, at 799.
49. FLA. CoNST. art. I, § 23. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
50. See Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985)
(holding that subpoena of bank records without notice to account holders did not violate their
privacy interests); Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Sirmons, 508 So. 2d 462, 463 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that section 23 does not foreclose press from obtaining and
releasing court records concerning state senator's divorce); Goldberg v. Johnson, 485 So. 2d
1386, 1388 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that terms of settlement agreement and
guardianship documents detailing estate of Shepard Broad Law Center benefactor, Leo
Goodwin, Sr., were available to public, overriding his right of privacy).
51. Sanchez, supra note 47, at 800.
52. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 548. See also Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 153 (Fla.
1989) (Ehrlick, C.J., concurring) (holding that even though privacy interests were indicated
when State gathered telephone numbers through use of pen register, State proved compelling
interests and accomplished its goal through least intrusive means available); In re T.W., 551
So. 2d 1186, 1191 (Fla. 1989) (holding that woman's constitutional right to terminate her
pregnancy extends to minors).
53. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1191.
1996] 1399
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governmental interference."54 The State of Florida, therefore, must satisfy
a hefty burden in order to override an individual's right of privacy.
IV. TEST FOR STATE INTRUSION INTO PRIVACY
A. What Triggers a Violation of Privacy? A Threshold Question
The proper standard of review for a claim of an unconstitutional
intrusion into one's zone of privacy under the Florida Constitution was first
enunciated in Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering.55 That
standard is now a well-established test used in each privacy claim arising in
Florida. 6 First, since the right of privacy is fundamental, the state must
have a compelling interest.57 This shifts the burden of proof to the govern-
ment to justify its intrusion upon a person's privacy interest.5 8 This burden
is only met by first "demonstrating that the challenged regulation serves a
compelling state interest and [second, that it] accomplishes its goal through
the least intrusive means."59  For a justified invasion, no governmental
alternatives must have been available.
B. The Intrusion
The Florida Constitution's privacy provision provides that citizens will
be free from governmental intrusion.6 By this provision, Floridians
supposedly have their privacy interests protected. The people could
reasonably believe that the government cannot intrude upon their personal
lives.
In City of North Miami v. Kurtz, however, Regulation 1-46 prevents
applicants from smoking on their own time, even in their own homes, for
a minimum of one year before they may be considered for a governmental
54. Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257, 267 (Fla. 1990) (Kogan, J., dissenting) (holding that
Florida constitutional privacy amendment does not apply to vendors of obscene material)
(quoting Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 98 (Fla. 1989)), cert. denied, 501 U.S.
1250 (1991)).
55. 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985).
56. See Stall, 570 So. 2d at 260; Shaktman, 553 So. 2d at 157; In re T.W., 551 So. 2d
at 1191; Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71, 76 (Fla. 1983)
(holding that Florida Bar requirement that applicants must disclose medical treatment records
does not violate their right of privacy).
57. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547.
58. Id.
59. Id
60. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
1400 [Vol. 20
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job.61 This regulation -allows governmental employers to take a peek inside
the home and life of Kurtz, as well as other possible candidates for
governmental employment. Since the regulation permits governmental
intrusion, whereas Article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution forbids
such intrusion, they directly Conflict. However, the Supreme Court of
Florida held that this regulation is perfectly valid and does not violate the
privacy provision.62 The court's message to Floridians is that it is
permissible for the City to demand to know if its applicants participated in
legal, off-duty conduct on their own time.
On the other hand, some believe, and courts have held in prior cases,
that the government should be limited to only that information it genuinely
needs to know.63  To illustrate, in Grusendorf v. Oklahoma City,64 the
court allowed a regulation prohibiting smoking before and during the
particular employment.65 There is a significant difference between the
facts in Kurtz and the facts in Grusendorf. Kurtz merely applied for a job
as a clerk-typist. Contrarily, in Grusendorf, the plaintiff was a firefighter.6
For a job with duties of a firefighter, where people's lives depend upon a
person's ability to perform, it is necessary for the employee to be in top
health. Therefore, a requirement that the individual not engage in unhealthy
behavior like smoking is a justified intrusion. In contrast, Kurtz's
applied-for position of clerk-typist lacks those stringent health and
conditioning requirements, and people's lives do not depend on it. Thus, the
regulation appears to be an unjustified intrusion into Kurtz's private life.
If the government is permitted to intrude into an applicant's private life
to determine if she smokes where the prohibition is not related to the job
sought, one cannot help but wonder where the line will be drawn. There are
no set limits or guidelines for what an employer may demand to know by
claiming that it is in the City's interest. There is, however, an extraordinary
61. See supra note 1. Regulation 1-46 does not directly state, "no smoking in your
home or on your own time." However, those are the obvious implications since it prohibits
all smoking for one year at any location in order to be eligible for a city job.
62. City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 1995
WL 588370 (U.S. 1996).
63. Gerald B. Cope, Jr., A Quick Look at Florida's New Right of Privacy, FLA. B.J., Jan.
1981, at 12, 13.
64. 816 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that no-smoking off-the-job rule did not
violate rights of employee).
65. 1l at 543.
66. Id.
67. Id.
1996] 1401
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amount of activities which are hazardous to one's health and may be the
target of employer regulation.68
For instance, because drinking beer could lead to alcoholism and liver
problems, and eating eggs could lead to high cholesterol and heart disease,
these activities could be banned by employers concerned about health
insurance costs. 69  However, although these interests could legitimately
relate to insurance claims, these types of bans by employers would probably
fail because these activities are socially acceptable. ° In many cases,
people drink beer and eat eggs as a part of their daily regimen.7' In
addition,
under the City's analysis, it could regulate when its employees or
prospective employees go to bed at night, what they eat for breakfast,
what kind of cars they drive, where they take their vacations and what
hobbies they engage in, all in the interest of making sure that those
employees meet some ideal of health and fitness and thus cost the City
less money to insure.72
Other prohibitions that employers might claim would help reduce
insurance costs for the taxpayers are activities that pose great health risks
but lack significant utility, such as consuming foods containing caffeine or
alcohol, participating in activities such as skiing, scuba diving, and
68. Some of the many acts that are hazardous to our health that could be possible targets
of employer regulation include the following activities:
Skiing, football, boxing, skydiving, and swimming are activities where a person puts
safety at risk.... Medical experts agree there is no dietary reason for adding salt to
foods. Yet many people do and subsequently increase their risk of hypertension and
other circulatory diseases. Sunbathing often leads to skin cancer. A higher risk of
coronary disease is associated with high cholesterol consumption. Automobile driving,
mining, and bridge construction often result in injuries and fatalities.
Walter E. Williams, Cigarettes and Property Rights, in CLEARING THE AIR 39, 40 (Robert
D. Tollison ed., 1988).
69. Elizabeth B. Thompson, The Constitutionality of an Off-Duty Smoking Ban for
Public Employees: Should the State Butt Out?, 43 VAND. L. REV. 491, 520 (1990).
70. Compare possible interests claimed by the City due to harm from drinking beer and
eating eggs with the harm from smoking. Smoking is looked down upon more and more in
society. While few people give much concern to those who drink beer and eat eggs, there
are employers who do not allow smoking on the job, and there are restaurants that either ban
smoking or maintain a separate section for smokers. This results in a stigmatization of
smokers, and it illustrates the discriminatory focus of Regulation 1-46.
71. Drinking beer and eating eggs are just as much a part of many people's daily
lifestyles as smoking. However, the City chose to focus its prohibition only on smoking.
72. Answer Brief of Respondent at 21.
1402 [Vol. 20
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motorcycle riding, or engaging in sexual activity with numerous partners.73
The idea of governmental control over its employees' off-duty lives74
belittles the fact that an employer purchases only an employee's labor, not
the employee (or in this case, a prospective employee).75 Allowing this
intrusion puts Florida's constitutional privacy provision to shame because
that which is expressly prohibited is actually being permitted.
Practical problems may arise from enforcing this regulation and allowing
the intrusion. One possible problem is verification of compliance with the
regulation. Verification of an off-duty ban may result in a deeper intrusion
into one's privacy.76 For instance, one possible verification procedure that
would result in more intrusion is a demand that an individual take a
polygraph test to determine if she lied about not smoking.7  Another
intrusive way to verify compliance is by looking into the employee's
medical records to determine if she has any symptoms associated with that
type of prohibited conduct.78 These two examples demonstrate the fact that
verification is one problem which may result from allowing this intrusion.
Another possible problem resulting from this intrusion is concern over
whether the government will be able to compel conduct of its employees
and prospective employees in addition to banning it.79 For instance, it is
a frightening concept to imagine that the government could compel a person
to exercise, to eat certain foods, or to go to bed at specific times, all in the
name of reducing insurance costs and increasing productivity. While the
idea may seem a bit of a stretch to some, at one time the idea of the
Supreme Court of Florida granting the government permission to enter into
a person's home to determine if she is engaging in lawful, off-duty conduct
was also considered a stretch.
These potential problems illustrate that the Kurtz decision could easily
lead to an increase in governmental power and a corresponding decrease in
73. Bernard J. Dushman & Lewis L. Maltby, Whose Life is It Anyway-Employer
Control of Off-Duty Behavior, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 645, 646 (1994) [hereinafter
Dushman & Maltby].
74. The idea of governmental control over its employees' lives includes sole intrusion
into a person's private life to determine if she is smoking, as well as any of the other
possible prohibitions mentioned.
75. Dushman & Maltby, supra note 73, at 658.
76. See Mark A. Rothstein, Refusing to Employ Smokers: Good Public Health or Bad
Public Policy?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 940,961-62 (1987) (providing analysis of problems
with verifying compliance with such regulation).
77. Id. at 962.
78. ld.
79. Thompson, supra note 69, at 520-21.
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citizens' rights.80 This intrusion is simply too much to bear, especially
when the prohibited conduct fails to relate to the job sought. Citizens of
North Miami who desire city jobs lost their right to participate in a specific
form of lawful, off-duty conduct. The Supreme Court of Florida held this
intrusion was justified because the state had compelling interests.
C. The City's Lack of a Compelling State Interest
1. Introduction
In City of North Miami v. Kurtz, 1 the Supreme Court of Florida found
the City's stated interests compelling, thereby justifying its intrusive behav-
ior.82 A state's interest only becomes compelling when "definite harm to
specific individuals that either has occurred," or will occur, is recogniz-
able. 3 The City claims two compelling interests in this case: a reduction
of costs and an increase in productivity. 4 The City has the burden of
justifying its intrusion into the private lives of its applicants.85
2. Reduction of Costs
The City claims it has a "compelling interest in saving money for
taxpayers by employing only healthy applicants. 8 6 In Kurtz, the City cites
to evidence which states that "a high percentage of smokers who have
adhered to the one year cessation requirement are unlikely to resume
smoking."8" Thus, the City concludes that the interest is compelling
because employees will be healthier, thereby costing the taxpayers less
money.88
80. This gives employers more economic power to control more than what is rightfully
theirs to control. Dushman & Maltby, supra note 73, at 658.
81. 653 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 1995 WL 588370 (U.S. 1996).
82. Id. at 1028.
83. Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257, 270 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Long v.
Florida, 501 U.S. 1250 (1991).
84. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1026.
85. Id. at 1027. This intrusion has been thrust upon Kurtz even though it does not relate
to the job, and she (and all other applicants who are being intruded upon) has no guarantee
of ever getting the job, even after she is forced to quit smoking for a year. Id.
86. Kurtz v. City of N. Miami, 625 So. 2d 899, 900 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd,
653 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 1995 WL 588370 (U.S. 1996).
87. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1027.
88. Id.
1404 [Vol. 20
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Usually, one would probably consider reductions of costs to the
taxpayers from health insurance a compelling interest. In fact, the Supreme
Court of Florida did just that in this case when it allowed a privacy intrusion
due to the City's claimed compelling interest in saving the taxpayers'
money.' 9 However, under the circumstances in this case, this interest
cannot be deemed compelling because it does not relate to Kurtz's ability
to perform her job. The interests will not be deemed compelling "[u]nless
an employee's off-work activity has a direct bearing on his or her ability to
perform job-related tasks or significantly interferes with business opera-
tion."'
The City claims that a compelling interest will be served by monitoring
the health of its prospective employees.9 However, this argument is
flawed because the City is not concerned with the actual health of its
employees. Since the compelling interest here is saving the taxpayers'
money by hiring healthy employees, the subject of Kurtz's health must be
examined.92 The City admits, however, that it did not even bother to
inquire into Kurtz's health.93 In fact, once Kurtz stated that she could not
truthfully sign the affidavit, 94 the City immediately turned her down
without even questioning her health.95 In truth, the City does not even
begin to examine any prospective applicants (even if they are the most
qualified) if they have used tobacco in the past year.9" The process of
waiting until after hiring to determine the health of employees, thereby
supposedly satisfying this interest, divests the City of qualified applicants
and forbids all applicants who smoke from demonstrating just exactly how
healthy they are.
Even though the City claims to be concerned with reducing health
insurance costs by refusing to hire smokers, current employees and
prospective employees who have not smoked for a year are permitted to
"light up" on the job.97 If the regulation's goal is to reduce costs by hiring
only non-smokers because they are healthier, the City's compelling interest
is defeated by the fact that once employees begin to work, they may smoke
89. Ma at 1028.
90. Rothstein, supra note 76, at 963.
91. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1027.
92. Her health should be examined to determine if she would be a healthy employee.
It was already determined that she was qualified. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
93. Answer Brief of Respondent at 5.
94. Itd at 3.
95. Id
96. Id at 5.
97. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1027.
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on the job as often as they please. Ironically, the place where workers may
smoke, in the workplace, is precisely where the regulation should be
enforced. The workplace is the one arena where employers may control
conduct, because that is where the regulation will have an effect on other
employees. The workplace is the one place with which employers must be
concerned. The current regulation deprives smokers of the opportunity to
demonstrate whether they are inflicted with any preexisting conditions that
may cost the City more money for health insurance.98 Therefore, the
City's interest in saving money for taxpayers cannot be deemed compelling.
3. Increase Productivity
The City's second claimed compelling interest is that the regulation will
increase productivity.99 Before this case reached the Supreme Court of
Florida, the Third District Court of Appeal held such an interest insufficient
to outweigh Kurtz's privacy interests.'0 The court reasoned that "the
regulation constitutes an impermissible intrusion into Kurtz's private conduct
and has no relevance to the performance of the duties involved with a clerk-
typist."' 01 In other words, her lawful, off-duty conduct has no relevance
to her performance on the job, nor her productivity once she begins to work.
When considering this particular interest, it is important to examine how
the City claims productivity will be increased. The City suggests that since
they employ healthier employees, productivity will increase due to lack of
illness and absenteeism."° On its face, this appears to be valid reasoning.
However, when this regulation as applied is closely examined, it clearly
does not support the City's stated interest because it permits on-the-job
smoking. 3 There is no rational correlation between a regulation designed
to increase productivity by refusing to hire smokers, and then subsequently
allowing them to smoke on the job. These two concepts clash and surely
do not support the City's interest.
Another important aspect of this second interest is the type of employees
the City will hire so that it may "increase productivity." As already estab-
lished, the City's regulation forbids hiring smokers. However, "[t]he effect
of the regulation is ... that a less-qualified-non-smoker may be hired by the
98. Answer Brief of Respondent at 5.
99. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1027.
100. Kurtz v. City of N. Miami, 625 So. 2d 899, 903 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993),
rev'd, 653 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 1995 WL 588370 (1996).
101. Id. at 901.
102. Answer Brief for Respondent at 11.
103. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1027.
1406 [Vol. 20
14
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 19
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss3/19
Stewart
City, while a more-qualified smoker would not even be allowed to
apply."'' It is extremely unlikely tyt the City can increase productivity
when there is a great possibility tha it will hire less-qualified workers.
There is no clear correlation between increasing productivity and refusing
to hire qualified smokers. Furthermore, excluding all qualified smokers
forces the City to choose from a limited number of applicants-only those
who do not smoke. 5 Once the non-smokers are hired, however, they
may at any time decide to become a smoker and smoke on the job. This
anomaly illustrates the City's claimed interest of increasing productivity
through this regulation is not supported by the evidence, and is therefore not
compelling.
D. Other Less Intrusive Means Available
1. Introduction
The only time a state interest can override personal privacy interests is
when it is impossible to fulfill it by any less intrusive means' °6 If the
state actor does not use the least intrusive means, the privacy interests are
not overcome and will, therefore, prevail over the state interest.'07
In Kurtz, the Supreme Court of Florida found that the City used the
least intrusive means. °8 It held that the regulation was the least intrusive
for three reasons. First, it does not prohibit smoking on the job. Second,
it does not affect current health care benefits of employees. Third, it
gradually reduces the number of employee smokers through attrition."°
Each of these reasons, however, fail as the least intrusive means available.
104. Answer Brief of Respondent at 6.
105. The City does not refute that Kurtz is qualified. Id. at 5.
106. See, e.g., Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla.
1985); see also Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid, & Assoc., Inc. v. State, 360 So. 2d 83, 96
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978), quashed sub. nom by Shevin v. Byron, 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla.
1980).
107. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71, 77 (Fla. 1983)
(Adkins, J., dissenting).
108. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1029.
109. Id.
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2. Allowing Smoking on the Job
First, the court claims that one reason Regulation 1-46 is the least
intrusive to privacy interests is because it allows smoking on the job."0
In fact, "the regulation only applies to job applicants and does not affect
current employees. Once an applicant has been hired, the applicant is free
to start or resume smoking at any time."'' This, however, lacks the status
as the least intrusive means.
In contrast, the regulation actually seems very intrusive because instead
of regulating conduct at work, it only intrudes into the applicants' conduct
at home and in private. While in some cases this type of regulation may be
reasonable, and even least intrusive, in Kurtz's situation, it fails to be both
reasonable and least intrusive.
For instance, when the off-duty regulation in Grusendorf v. Oklaho-
ma"2 is compared with the regulation in Kurtz, the meaning of the term
"least intrusive" manifests. In Grusendorf, a regulation was held to be the
least intrusive because the regulated job was a firefighter, an occupation
which has mandatory health requirements upon which citizens' lives
depend." 3 However, in Kurtz, the job was merely secretarial and had no
mandatory health requirements.1'4 Since the job for which Kurtz applied
does not have an obvious mandatory health requirement upon which lives
depend, the respective regulation does not appear to be the least intrusive.
In addition, it is understandable to the reasonable person that
[b]etween the hours of nine and five, the average person's life is not her
own. Her employer can tell her what to do, and when and how to do
it.... [However, flew would want to live in a society in which they
were subjected to employer control twenty-four hours a day."'
It is logical, and even practical, for one to assume that the employer may
prohibit on-the-job smoking as part of the rules. That way the City could
choose from the most qualified applicants and then enforce the no-smoking
policy during working hours. The City, however, chose to travel a different
route in this case, and in doing so, gave itself permission to control any
prospective employee's life twenty-four hours a day. Certainly, allowing
110. Ud
111. Id. at 1026-27.
112. 816 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1987).
113. Id. at 542.
114. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1026.
115. Dushman & Maltby, supra note 73, at 646.
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smoking while on-the-job and prohibiting it while off-the-job is an under-
inclusive policy that does not employ the least intrusive means.
3. Health Care Benefits
The second reason the court accepted for the regulation being the least
intrusive means was that it does not affect current health care benefits of
employees." 6 Even though the City claims to be concerned with health
care benefits, Regulation 1-46 limits itself to the prohibition of smoking,
which is just one aspect of life that may cause a person harm. The City
fails to address why hiring bans on people with other health conditions that
will affect the health care costs"' is any different than smoking, or more
importantly, why they too are not prohibited. Hiring others that may either
have a serious health condition, or may participate in dangerous activi-
ties"' which could result in high costs to the taxpayers, is not prohibited
by this regulation. The City claims to be concerned about health care
benefits of employees, yet it only focuses on a single possible cause of harm
while failing to address numerous other risk factors. This appears to be
discrimination directed at smokers, and it certainly does not appear to be the
least intrusive means available.
Also, this reasoning fails as the least intrusive means when dealing with
health care benefits because other alternatives are available for health care
which the City did not consider. For instance, the employer could allow
insurance options." 9 The City could give all applicants, smokers and non-
smokers alike, the option of waiving insurance coverage."2 In the present
case, Kurtz already had her own health insurance; therefore, she would not
have been a burden on the taxpayers because they would not be providing
her with health care.'
Next, the City could implement a premium increase for insurance of
employees who smoke." This type of alternative would also eliminate
any excess cost to the taxpayers. Any insurance cost increase would be paid
for by the smoker herself, which results in a less burdensome alternative.
116. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1029.
117. Other conditions that may affect health care costs include, but are not limited to:
obesity, diabetes, hypertension, and cancer. See Answer Brief of Respondent at 5.
118. These dangerous activities include, but are not limited to: unsafe sex, alligator
wrestling, skydiving, and excessive television watching. Id. at 6.
119. Il at 5.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Answer Brief of Respondent at 5.
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Another alternative, one which the City already initiated, is a smoking
cessation program."z The City's own expert witness testified that these
programs, "[if] properly implemented, can have up to a 40 percent
effectiveness rate."' 24 However, the City failed to discover if this program
was a success before implementing Regulation 1-46.25 Had the City
given the program some time to demonstrate its efficiency, or even
attempted to establish if it was at all successful, it may not have had to
resort to this regulation. The City had no idea whether this program was
cost-effective nor whether the program could save money. 26 Clearly, this
would have been another less intrusive alternative available.
Finally, the City's own evidence demonstrates that "most of the costs
associated with employee smoking (lost productivity, secondhand smoke,
ventilation and maintenance costs for segregation of smokers) can only be
eliminated by a prohibition on on-the-job smoking."'27 The simplest and
least intrusive means to deal with this issue would have been to ban on-the-
job smoking. A ban of on-the-job smoking would help reduce smoking-
associated costs and provide equal opportunities between the smokers and
the non-smokers alike. In contrast, the effect of this regulation is the
prevention of smokers from having a chance of obtaining any city job.
4. Reduction of Smokers Through Attrition
The final reasoning the court found to support its finding that the
regulation is the least intrusive means is that it reduces the number of
smokers through attrition.' The number of smokers in society today is
staggering. According to the National Center for Health Statistics, thirty-
three percent of men and twenty-eight percent of women in the United
States are smokers.'29 The City hopes for a gradual reduction in the
number of smokers by imposing a flat ban on hiring them for governmental
jobs.
123. Id. at 9.
124. Id. at 10.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Answer Brief of Respondent at 10.
128. City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1029 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 1995
WL 588370 (U.S. 1996).
129. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFF., INC., WHERE THERE'S SMOKE: PROBLEMS AND POLICIES
CONCERNING SMOKING IN THE WORKPLACE 8 (1986).
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There is, however, a serious flaw with the reasoning that this regulation
will reduce the number of smokers through attrition. This defect is
illustrated by the following situation. Suppose an applicant, Avis, desperate-
ly needs the job so she struggles and succeeds in quitting smoking for one
year. The City then hires Avis. Since the City permits on-the-job smoking,
and because smoking is known to be a highly addictive behavior, the
chances are very likely that the same person who quit for one year will
resume the habit once in the presence of other smokers during the average
work day. Thus, Avis starts smoking again, thereby not reducing the
number of smokers on the work-force, but rather, increasing it. This
probable scenario fails to support the City's claim of least intrusive means.
These alternatives prove that the City did not use the least intrusive
means available when it implemented this regulation. In contrast, it invaded
Kurtz's right of privacy under the Florida Constitution by allowing the
government to prohibit legal, off-duty conduct to determine if an applicant
will be considered for a city job."3 Florida should begin to look at the
purpose of its own privacy amendment..' and also examine how other
states deal with similar amendments for suggestions on how to handle these
types of regulations.
V. SUGGESTIONS FROM OTHER STATES FOR DEALING WITH
PRIVACY
A. Introduction
As illustrated by Kurtz, Florida courts are reluctant to take Article I,
section 23 at face value." For an idea as to how privacy issues should
be handled, two other states' privacy amendments shall be reviewed. This
review will demonstrate how courts in those respective states deal with
privacy issues arising from state regulations.
B. Alaska's Explicit Privacy Provision
Alaska, like Florida, has an explicit privacy provision in its constitu-
tion.' The Alaska Constitution, Article I, section 22, provides that "[t]he
130. The applicant only receives consideration for the job. Remember, there is no
guarantee that she will even be hired. This illustrates the severity of the intrusion into an
applicant's privacy.
131. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 23.
132. See Sanchez, supra note 47.
133. See Sanchez, supra note 47, at 799.
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right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed."'1
This amendment is very similar to Florida's privacy amendment because
they both recognize the same basic ideal. 135  However, privacy amend-
ments, solely on their face, do not demonstrate what effect they have on
society. It is their interpretation and power given by the courts that allow
these amendments to have an effect on society at large.
A significant case allowing an examination of what the Alaska
constitution's privacy amendment means to Alaskans is Ravin v. State.
136
In this case, a man was initially convicted for possessing marijuana in his
own home.137  In Ravin, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that no
adequate justification exists for the State's intrusion into a citizen's right of
privacy by its prohibition of possession of marijuana by an adult for
personal consumption in home; thus, possession of marijuana by adults at
home for personal use is constitutionally protected. 38 The court relied on
Alaska's privacy amendment and previous United States Supreme Court
cases 139 to determine that an individual has a right of privacy to do as he
pleases in his own home."'
This case is similar to Kurtz because they both involve the prohibition
of smoking. However, the substance smoked in Ravin was illegal. 4 '
Even though it was unlawful, the Supreme Court of Alaska still found that
as long as it was done in the privacy of one's own home, the State lacked
the ability to intrude. 142
The State of Florida should expand its constitutional horizons and look
upon Alaska as an ideal example to follow. Alaska drew the line of state
intrusion into the home at the threshold of the front door. In Kurtz,
however, the Supreme Court of Florida has allowed government employers
to open that door and barge in, thereby giving them permission to forbid all
applicants for a city job from lawfully smoking in their own homes. 43
134. ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 22.
135. The ideal recognized in both the Florida and Alaska constitutions is being free from
governmental intrusion.
136. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
137. Id. at 496.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 498-99 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S 557 (1969)).
140. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504.
141. The illegal substance smoked in Ravin was marijuana. Id. at 496.
142. Id. at 504.
143. City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1029 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 1995
WL 588370 (U.S. 1996).
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The Supreme Court of Florida should follow Alaska's precedence and
enforce Florida's privacy amendment to protect lawful, off-duty conduct that
takes place at home, outside of the working arena. Florida must not permit
the government to intrude upon a person's private life, as did the Kurtz
court. 1" Instead, Florida should follow the court's rationale in Ravin and
protect lawful, off-duty conduct that is irrelevant to the performance of
one's job and takes place in one's own home. To further exemplify
Florida's lack of protection of privacy, Rhode Island's privacy provision will
be considered.
C. Rhode Island's Explicit Privacy Provision
The State of Rhode Island also has an explicit privacy provision. This
provision, however, is more direct in its protection. 141 It "prohibits
employers from refusing to hire or otherwise discriminate against employees
for the lawful off-duty use of tobacco products."' 46 Thus, Regulation 1-46
would not have been upheld in Rhode Island. In addition, Louisiana,
Oklahoma, and Virginia also bar employers from discriminating against
employees based on lawful, off-duty behavior such as smoking. 47
Florida should follow these states and provide stronger protection for its
citizens. For instance, Rhode Island's amendment 148 clearly provides
protection to smokers from discrimination. In contrast, Florida's privacy
amendment has not received much support or enforcement, as illustrated by
the decision in Kurtz. Floridians need more privacy protection before the
State may intrude into more serious and personal aspects of private lives.
For instance, more 'protection is necessary before intrusions into lawful
sexual behavior, a woman's plans for procreation to eliminate family leave,
as well as what religions are practiced by applicants are permitted. 14
9
Kurtz may have opened the door for such intrusions. Thus, Florida ought
to protect its citizens by following the lead of other states. It should imple-
ment a stricter privacy provision, or at least as a bare minimum, apply the
144. Id. at 1029.
145. See Deborah S. Crumbley & Gregory A. Hearing, Where They Smoke, They May
Get Fired: An Overview of Significant Workplace Smoking Issues, FLA. B.J., Oct. 1994, at
108.
146. Id.
147. Lisa Frye, "You've Come a Long Way Smokers": North Carolina Preserves the
Employee's Right to Smoke off the Job in General Statutes Section 95-28.2, 71 N.C. L. REV.
1963, 1978 n.102 (1993).
148. See Crumbley & Hearing, supra note 145 and accompanying text.
149. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1029 (Kogan, J., dissenting).
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strict scrutiny standard the way it was intended. This will give the Florida
Constitution's privacy provision its maximum potential of protection of
privacy for Floridians.
VI. CONCLUSION
Kurtz was denied an employment opportunity because of what she
lawfully did in the privacy of her own home. Even though she smokes at
home, she is willing to abide by any on-the-job smoking prohibition."
Nevertheless, the City only forbids off-duty smoking, leaving the right to
smoke on-the-job intact. This regulation is extreme and should fail to
satisfy the strict scrutiny test that would justify such an intrusion, as it is
merely a pretext for the main "problem" that the City wants to address. The
City's main flaw in designing this regulation is that it fails to address this
real problem: the City does not want smokers on its payroll. Instead of
limiting the conduct of every possible applicant, the City's regulation should
have taken the form of an on-the-job smoking ban. This type of prohibition
is more acceptable because it would not control what the citizens of Florida
may do on their own time, in their own home, as well as any other time
they are not on the clock.
This is an apparent case of the government attempting to control private
lives of citizens. In Kurtz, the Supreme Court of Florida invites such
intrusions. Such precedent by the court opens the door to greater intrusions
than just allowing the City to implement this regulation. Florida's privacy
provision must receive the protection that was originally intended before the
right to privacy is just a memory of what could have been.
Deborah Lynn Stewart
150. Answer Brief of Respondent at 4.
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